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CASE COMMENT 
GOODYEAR DUNLOP’S FAILED ATTEMPT TO REFINE THE 
SCOPE OF GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION  
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 
(2011) 
Camilla Cohen∗ 
In first-year civil procedure, students spend a great deal of time parsing 
an “answer” to a deceptively simple question: When may a state exercise 
its adjudicatory authority over an out-of-state defendant? Since Pennoyer v. 
Neff, the United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of personal 
jurisdiction in at least thirty-five cases spanning three centuries.1 Following 
the Court’s decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,2 a state’s 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant must satisfy two 
requirements. First, the state must have a statutory basis for asserting 
adjudicatory authority over a foreign defendant.3 Second, if the claims 
satisfy the statutory requirements for jurisdiction, the state must further 
determine whether the foreign defendant has established “minimum 
contacts” with the forum “such that the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”4 Rooted in 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, this second inquiry 
places a limit on the state’s adjudicatory authority in order to ensure the 
“fair and orderly administration of the laws.”5  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 ∗. J.D. 2013, University of Florida Levin College of Law; M.S.T. 2010, Fordham 
University; B.A. 2008, University of Florida. I would like to thank Professor Amy Mashburn for 
inspiring me to write this Comment and the Florida Law Review for their professionalism and 
constant attention to detail. I am also eternally grateful to my family for all of their love and support 
along the way.  
 1. See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); 
Bagdon v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N.Y. 432, 111 N.E. 1075 (1916); Int’l 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 
437 (1952); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 
(1985); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burnham v. Superior 
Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).   
 2. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).  
 3. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1068.1 (3d ed. 2002) (stating that “state long-arm statutes simply cannot reach beyond the limits 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 4. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 5. Id. at 319.  
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Following the minimum contacts requirement set forth in International 
Shoe,6 personal jurisdiction jurisprudence has developed significantly over 
time. The development of this doctrine, however, has focused heavily on 
cases dealing with specific jurisdiction.7 Until 2011, Perkins v. Benguet8 
and Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall9 were the only Supreme 
Court cases that analyzed the scope of general personal jurisdiction.10  
Consequently, lower courts were left to develop the contours of general 
personal jurisdiction, resulting in a hodgepodge of inconsistent holdings 
that often conflated several important distinctions between specific and 
general jurisdiction.11 Now, twenty-eight years after Helicopteros, the 
Supreme Court has finally revisited general personal jurisdiction in 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown.12 
This Comment analyzes the Court’s recent decision in Goodyear, 
concluding that the case produced the correct result, but failed to provide 
any meaningful future guidance for lower courts. One significant 
shortcoming of the case is the absence of any theoretical justification for 
the assertion of general personal jurisdiction. Without a basis for 
determining why general jurisdiction is appropriate in some circumstances 
and not others, the Court missed an opportunity to encourage a semblance 
of consistency in lower court decisions concerning general personal 
jurisdiction.13 Additionally, the decision failed to provide a clear analytical 
framework for deciding future cases. While the decision may be interpreted 
as refining the test for asserting general jurisdiction, Goodyear could just 
                                                                                                                     
 6. Id. at 310.  
 7. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011); see 
also Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in a Twenty-
First Century World, 64 FLA. L. REV. 387, 423–24 (2012) [hereinafter Rhodes, Nineteenth Century 
Personal Jurisdiction] (stating that Perkins and Helicopteros “comprised the entirety of the 
Supreme Court’s post-Shoe discussion of general jurisdiction”). The difference between specific 
and general jurisdiction is that the former may be asserted over a foreign defendant if the 
defendant’s contacts with the forum are related to the plaintiff’s cause of action. Arthur T. von 
Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. 
REV. 1121, 1136 (1966). On the other hand, general jurisdiction may be asserted over a nonresident 
defendant for any cause of action unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. Id. Until 
recently, the relevant inquiry for an assertion of general jurisdiction was whether the defendant’s 
contacts with the forum were “continuous . . . substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit 
against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” Int’l 
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.  
 8. 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 9. 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
 10. See Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 422–24.  
 11. Id. at 424; Friedrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 141, 152 (2001); Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. 
REV. 721, 724 (1988) [hereinafter Brilmayer et al., A General Look].  
 12. 131 S. Ct. at 2851.  
 13. See infra text accompanying notes 58–61 for a discussion of the inconsistent lower court 
decisions regarding general personal jurisdiction.  
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as easily be narrowly confined to its facts in light of the manner in which 
the Court framed the issues.14   
In April 2004, Julian Brown and Matthew Helms died in a bus accident 
while heading to the Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris, France.15 The 
victims were two thirteen-year-old boys from North Carolina.16 Following 
the boys’ deaths, their parents, as administrators of their estates, sued in the 
North Carolina Superior Court for wrongful death.17 The complaint 
attributed the accident to defective tires manufactured by Goodyear USA—
an Ohio corporation—and its foreign subsidiaries.18 As such, Goodyear 
USA, Goodyear Luxembourg, Goodyear Turkey, and Goodyear France 
were all named as defendants.19  
Unlike their parent corporation, Goodyear USA, the foreign subsidiaries 
all moved to dismiss the claims against them on the basis that North 
Carolina’s courts lacked adjudicatory authority over them.20 The North 
Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the 
defendants’ motion.21  
The North Carolina Court of Appeals agreed that North Carolina lacked 
specific jurisdiction over the defendants.22 This was because the accident 
occurred in France and the faulty tire giving rise to the accident was 
manufactured in Turkey.23 In sum, the defendants lacked the relevant 
contacts with North Carolina to make them amenable to suit on the basis of 
specific jurisdiction.24 The appellate court found, however, that the foreign 
subsidiaries’ contacts with North Carolina rendered the defendants 
amenable to suit on the basis of general jurisdiction.25 The court based its 
holding on a “stream of commerce” theory, reasoning that the quantum of 
the defendants’ tires that reached North Carolina’s markets was sufficient 
to establish general jurisdiction.26 After the North Carolina Supreme Court 
denied the defendants’ appeal, the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in the summer of 2011.27  
Corporate entities like Goodyear USA’s subsidiaries, while 
incorporated in one state, are technically “present” in numerous states. 
                                                                                                                     
 14. Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 549, 551–52 (2012). 
 15. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 2851–52. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. at 2852.  
 21. Id.  
 22. Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 388 (N.C. App. 2009). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. at 395. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011). 
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Recognizing the legal fiction of the corporate entity,28 International Shoe 
expanded territorial notions of sovereignty and personal jurisdiction by 
adopting the following minimum contacts standard: 
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a 
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present 
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum 
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.’29 
The holding expanded personal jurisdiction by considering a foreign 
corporation’s contacts with the forum state—as opposed to physical 
presence—as the relevant inquiry for asserting personal jurisdiction.30 The 
Court determined that a foreign defendant could be considered “present” in 
the state where the defendant’s activities had been “continuous and 
systematic” and those activities had “give[n] rise to the liabilities sued 
on.”31 Additionally, the Court recognized an alternate basis for jurisdiction 
where a foreign defendant’s contacts were “continuous,” “substantial[,] 
and of such a nature as to justify suit against it” on an unrelated claim.32  
In an effort to label International Shoe’s revised bases for asserting 
personal jurisdiction, Professors Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman 
coined the terms “general jurisdiction” and “specific jurisdiction” in 
1966.33 Although not phrased as such, International Shoe recognized this 
distinction when Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone differentiated between 
activities that had “give[n] rise to the liabilities sued on,”34 and activities 
that were “continuous,” “substantial,” and of “such a nature as to justify 
suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct 
from those activities.”35 Today, the former category is regarded as specific 
jurisdiction, while the latter category is regarded as general jurisdiction.36  
                                                                                                                     
 28. Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 393.  
 29. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 30. The Court noted “the terms ‘present’ or ‘presence’ are used merely to symbolize those 
activities of the corporation’s agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to 
satisfy the demands of due process.” As such, physical presence was no longer the only factor in 
establishing personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. Instead, presence would be determined 
by analyzing a foreign defendant’s contacts with the state. Id. at 316–17.  
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 318 (stating that courts have justified adjudicating a claim when “continuous 
corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit 
against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities”). 
 33. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 7, at 1136. 
 34. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.  
 35. Id. at 318.  
 36. While the decision of International Shoe created two distinct bases for asserting personal 
jurisdiction, Mary Twitchell has argued that the decision actually minimized the role of general 
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After the Supreme Court adopted the minimum contacts standard, the 
development of specific jurisdiction far outpaced that of general 
jurisdiction.37 Until recently, the Court had only addressed the issue of 
general jurisdiction in Perkins and Helicopteros.38 Notably, Perkins is the 
only post-International Shoe case that established the requisite contacts 
necessary for applying general jurisdiction.39 In that case, the defendant, 
Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, was initially located in the 
Philippines, but the Japanese occupation of the islands forced the 
company’s president to evacuate and move to his home state of Ohio.40 
While in Ohio, the president maintained an office where he conducted all 
of the company’s affairs for the duration of the war.41 Specifically, the 
defendant 
carried on there correspondence relating to the business of the 
company and to its employees. He drew and 
distributed . . . salary checks on behalf of the 
company . . . . He used and maintained . . . two active bank 
accounts carrying substantial balances of company funds.42  
The Court held that these contacts, taken together, were continuous and 
substantial enough to justify suit against the company on causes of action 
arising from dealings entirely distinct from its contacts with the forum 
state.43  
Thirty-two years later, the Supreme Court revisited general jurisdiction 
in Helicopteros.44 In that case, a Columbian corporation, Helicol, provided 
transportation for oil and construction companies in South America.45 One 
                                                                                                                     
jurisdiction. Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 625 
(1988). Instead of providing an equal and distinct basis for jurisdiction, the category of general 
jurisdiction was actually intended “as a secondary basis for jurisdiction, important primarily when 
the cause of action did not arise from [the] defendant’s forum activities.” Id. 
 37. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011).  
 38. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415–16 (1984) (“We 
thus must explore the nature of Helicol’s contacts with the [forum] to determine whether they 
constitute the kind of continuous and systematic general business contacts the Court found to exist 
in Perkins.”); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952). See also Charles 
W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 807, 836 (2004) 
[hereinafter Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction]. 
 39. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854, 2857 (discussing the outcomes of Perkins, where general 
jurisdiction was appropriate, and Helicopteros, and stating that the contacts were insufficient to 
exercise personal jurisdiction, before ruling that the facts in the instant case were not sufficient to 
establish general jurisdiction).  
 40. Perkins, 342 U.S at 447.  
 41. Id. at 447–48.  
 42. Id. at 448.  
 43. Id.   
 44. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 409 (1984).  
 45. Id.  
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of its helicopters crashed in Peru.46 Among the passengers that died were 
four U.S. citizens.47 The families brought an action against Helicol in 
Texas.48 Because the families conceded that the facts did not support the 
application of specific jurisdiction, the Court relied on a general 
jurisdiction analysis in order to determine whether the foreign corporation 
was amenable to suit in Texas.49  
The Court’s analysis of the facts focused on comparing Helicol’s 
contacts with Texas to the contacts that Benguet Mining Company had 
with the state.50 According to the Court, the contacts in Perkins were 
“continuous and systematic,” whereas the contacts in Helicopteros were 
not.51 Helicol had received $5 million in payments drawn from a Texas 
bank, travelled to Texas to negotiate a contract, purchased over $4 million 
in equipment from a Texas company, and received employee training in 
Texas.52  
Each contact was discounted in turn. First, the Court refused to consider 
the $5 million in payment as a relevant contact, because the payment arose 
from the unilateral activity of a Texas resident, and not from the company 
itself.53 Second, the company’s sole trip to Texas to negotiate a contract 
was neither continuous nor systematic.54 Last, the mere purchase of 
equipment and training was not enough to warrant the imposition of 
general jurisdiction over the defendant.55  
Taken together, Perkins and Helicopteros stand for the proposition that 
general jurisdiction cannot rest solely on the quantitative aspect of a 
defendant’s contacts with the forum.56 Instead, the nature of the contacts 
should be considered as well, thus leading to a qualitative analysis.57 
Arguably, Helicol’s contacts with Texas were quantitatively significant. 
However, unlike the defendant’s contacts in Perkins, Helicol’s contacts 
were qualitatively unsubstantial.  
If we are to read the facts of each of these cases literally, they stand for 
the proposition that general jurisdiction may be asserted in circumstances 
where the defendant has essentially established his principal place of 
business within the forum. In such a case, the contacts are sufficiently 
substantial and of such a nature as to justify the defendant’s amenability to 
                                                                                                                     
 46. Id. at 410.  
 47. Id.  
 48. See generally id.  
 49. Id. at 415–16.  
 50. Id. at 416.  
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. at 410–11, 416.  
 53. Id. at 416–17. 
 54. Id. at 416. 
 55. Id. at 417. 
 56. Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, supra note 38, at 816, 836.  
 57. Id. at 816. 
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suit for any cause of action. In contrast, mere purchases in the forum and 
trips to the forum related to those purchases are by their nature insufficient 
to grant general jurisdiction, no matter how substantial and continuous 
such contacts may be. The basic qualitative difference between Perkins and 
Helicopteros is that in Perkins, the out of state defendant was essentially 
conducting and directing its business from within the state, whereas in 
Helicopteros, the foreign defendant was conducting and directing its 
business outside the state.  
The holdings of Perkins and Helicopteros, however, did not provide 
courts with a satisfactory theoretical framework for analyzing general 
jurisdiction as it arises in a myriad of distinct factual scenarios.58 Neither 
Perkins nor Helicopteros established a justification for asserting general 
jurisdiction. Both opinions merely listed the defendant’s contacts with each 
respective forum, deciding certain contacts warranted general jurisdiction, 
while others did not. There was never a discussion as to why the contacts 
in Perkins were stronger than those in Helicopteros. In fact, the analysis of 
Helicopteros consisted of an ad hoc comparison between the facts of that 
case and the facts in Perkins. As a result, lower courts have mirrored this 
factual comparison, zoning in on the “continuous and substantial” aspect of 
the International Shoe analysis, while failing to consider the decision’s 
focus on the nature of those contacts.59 Likewise, lower courts bolster their 
application of general jurisdiction over foreign defendants by analyzing the 
relationship of the defendant’s contacts to the dispute.60 General 
jurisdiction analysis, however, focuses solely on the defendant’s 
relationship to the forum.61  
In Goodyear, the Supreme Court was presented with the opportunity to 
revisit the holdings of Perkins and Helicopteros. Many believe that the 
unanimous decision in Goodyear indicates that the Court has tightened the 
reins on general jurisdiction. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the 
opinion of the Court, which framed the issue as whether North Carolina 
                                                                                                                     
 58. Id. at 817; Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 119, 124–25 (2001).  
 59. The Myth of General Jurisdiction explains that: 
Most courts simply list the defendant’s contacts and conclude that they are, or are 
not, sufficient. What is not said is often more important than what is said. Not only 
do courts avoid analyzing in depth the nature and scope of a defendant’s contacts 
or discussing the policies underlying general jurisdiction, but they also never ask 
the question that is crucial to a truly dispute-blind jurisdiction analysis: whether 
the defendant’s contacts are such that the exercise of jurisdiction would be fair for 
most causes of action brought by the plaintiff. 
 Twitchell, supra note 36, at 637. 
 60. Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, supra note 38, at 818. 
 61. Id. at 818–20; Twitchell, supra note 36, at 611–12.  
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could exercise general jurisdiction over Goodyear USA’s foreign 
subsidiaries based on a stream of commerce theory.62  
The Court held that North Carolina’s courts lacked both personal and 
general jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiaries.63 Justice Ginsburg found 
that the defendants’ connections with the state were too tenuous to support 
general jurisdiction.64 The defendant-petitioners’ relevant contacts (or lack 
of contacts) with North Carolina were listed as follows:  
[P]etitioners are not registered to do business in North 
Carolina. They have no place of business, employees, or bank 
accounts in North Carolina. They do not design, manufacture, 
or advertise their products in North Carolina. And they do not 
solicit business in North Carolina or themselves sell or ship 
tires to North Carolina customers. Even so, a small percentage 
of petitioners’ tires (tens of thousands out of tens of millions 
manufactured between 2004 and 2007) were distributed 
within North Carolina by other Goodyear USA affiliates.65 
After listing petitioners’ weak connections with the state, Justice 
Ginsburg proceeded to explicitly draw the line between specific and 
general jurisdiction.66 As an illustration, the Court noted that the “the 
paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's 
domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the 
corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”67 The error of North Carolina’s 
courts stemmed from their failure to recognize “the essential difference 
between case-specific and all-purpose (general) jurisdiction.”68 
Importantly, the Court noted that the stream of commerce theory was only 
relevant in the context of specific jurisdiction.69 While ties under a stream 
of commerce theory might “bolster” the exercise of specific jurisdiction, 
those ties “do not warrant “a determination that . . . the forum has general 
jurisdiction over the defendant.”70 The Court concluded its analysis by 
comparing the petitioners’ contacts with the petitioners in Perkins and 
Helicopteros.71 Justice Ginsburg described the facts in Perkins as “‘[t]he 
                                                                                                                     
 62. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (2011) (“Are 
foreign subsidiaries of a United States parent corporation amenable to suit in state court on claims 
unrelated to any activity of the subsidiaries in the forum State?”).  
 63. Id. at 2851.  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. at 2852. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 2853–54 (emphasis added). 
 68. Id. at 2855.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 2856–57. 
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textbook case of general jurisdiction appropriately exercised over a foreign 
corporation that has not consented to suit in the forum.’”72  
By contrast, the facts in Goodyear—even more so than those in 
Helicopteros—clearly demonstrate that the defendants had only a tenuous 
connection with the forum. As such, the Court’s holding came as no 
surprise. However, the Court chose to go one step further: it refined 
International Shoe’s analysis for general jurisdiction by emphasizing the 
notion of the “home” base.73 The Court rejected North Carolina’s 
reasoning that doing “some quantum of business” within the forum would 
in and of itself warrant the court’s exercise of general jurisdiction.74 
Rather, it found that general jurisdiction should be limited to situations 
where the foreign defendant conducts intrastate operations that “are 
directed, controlled, and coordinated within the state.”75  
While the result was correct, the Court’s decision fell short in its 
attempt to rein in the liberal application of general personal jurisdiction. 
First, the Court detailed what types of contacts are sufficient to assert 
general jurisdiction, but it failed to state why those contacts are critical in 
light of the minimum contacts test set forth in International Shoe.76 Stated 
another way, the Court missed an opportunity to provide any justification 
in either policy or theory for the proper assertion of general jurisdiction.77 
Is the requirement that the nature of a defendant’s contacts be such that it is 
regarded as “essentially at home” rooted in ideas of reciprocal benefits,78 
foreseeability,79 convenience to the defendant,80 state sovereignty,81 or 
                                                                                                                     
 72. Id. at 2856 (quoting Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 
1981)). 
 73. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54 (“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise 
of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one 
in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”) (emphasis added); id. at 2851 (“A court 
may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any 
and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ 
as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”) (emphasis added); id. at 2857 (“Unlike 
the defendant in Perkins, whose sole wartime business activity was conducted in Ohio, petitioners 
are in no sense at home in North Carolina.”) (emphasis added). 
 74. Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 430. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Hoffheimer, supra note 14, at 594–95.  
 77. See generally Lea Brilmayer & Matthew Smith, The (Theoretical) Future of Personal 
Jurisdiction: Issues Left Open by Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown and J. McIntyre Machinery v. 
Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV., 617, 618–20 (2012) (discussing the absence of any political or theoretical 
analysis in Goodyear and Nicastro, along with “collateral issues about the meaning and 
consequences of state sovereignty”—including causality, symmetry, and international due process).   
 78. Brilmayer et al., A General Look, supra note 11, at 732.   
 79. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) (noting that 
“the defendant’s ability to anticipate suit renders the assertion of jurisdiction fair. In this way, the 
opinion made foreseeability the touchstone of jurisdiction.”). But see Brilmayer et al., A General 
Look, supra note 11, at 766 (noting that since International Shoe, the test for general jurisdiction is 
more than simple foreseeability, it is a holistic look at fairness).  
9
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predictability of a definite forum?82 Instead of providing a theoretical basis 
for general personal jurisdiction, the Court’s decision was guided by a 
“comparative evaluation of corporate activity,”83 discussing the facts in 
Perkins and Helicopteros as compared to those in Goodyear.84 The natural 
consequence of this gap in the Court’s analysis is that the significance of 
its refined emphasis on the “home” base will be subsumed by the tendency 
of lower courts to engage in an arbitrary comparative factual analysis.85  
In addition to the Court’s failure to provide any theoretical guidance, 
the decision also failed to provide a clear analytical framework for the 
application of general jurisdiction. The decision can easily be interpreted as 
adopting both a broad and narrow interpretation of the reach of general 
jurisdiction. Some scholars have suggested that the case can be limited to 
the rule that foreign manufacturers who sell their products in a state 
through intermediaries do not have sufficient contacts to warrant the 
application of general jurisdiction86—or that a stream of commerce theory 
will not support the application of general jurisdiction.87 Read in this light, 
lower courts can—and some already have88—limit Goodyear to its facts. 
For example, in J.B. ex rel. Benjamin v. Abbott Laboratories Inc.,89 the 
Northern District of Illinois rejected the defendant’s contention that 
Goodyear changed the standard for asserting general jurisdiction, stating: 
“the Supreme Court did not replace or redefine the well-established 
standard for establishing general jurisdiction.”90 The court went on to find 
general jurisdiction where the defendant “maintained regular, continuous 
                                                                                                                     
 80. Brilmayer et al., A General Look, supra note 11, at 730. 
 81. Id. at 731.  
 82. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 7, at 1137. 
 83. Hoffheimer, supra note 14, at 551.  
 84. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2857 (2011).  
 85. See Twitchell, supra note 36, at 636–37, for a discussion on the confusion of lower court 
opinions regarding general personal jurisdiction:  
The melange of pre- and post-International Shoe formulas used to justify exercises 
of general jurisdiction reveals that courts have not developed a coherent view of 
the kind of analysis needed in this area. . . . The absence of policy analysis in cases 
that purport to find general jurisdiction suggests that courts are unsure about what 
policies support this exercise of jurisdiction. . . . [M]ost courts simply list the 
defendant’s contacts and conclude that they are, or are not, sufficient.  
Id.; see also Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, supra note 38, at 817 (“The Supreme Court’s 
decisions have also not articulated any type of theoretical approach underlying general jurisdiction, 
instead merely employing an ad hoc comparative analysis to prior precedent.”).  
 86. Hoffheimer, supra note 14, at 551.  
 87. Goodyear Dunlop, 131 S. Ct. at 2855.  
 88. For a discussion of two recent decisions narrowly interpreting Goodyear, see Hoffheimer, 
supra note 14, at 600 n.286.  
 89. 12-CV-385, 2013 WL 452807 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2013).  
 90. Id. at *3.  
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business contacts in the Southern District. By soliciting business, selling 
and marketing products, and employing a sales team in the Southern 
District, [the defendant] could reasonably anticipate being haled into the 
District.”91 Absent from the decision was any reference to Justice 
Ginsburg’s notion of “at home.”  
On the other hand, Goodyear can be read broadly, as adopting a theory 
that general jurisdiction should only be asserted against a foreign corporate 
defendant if the forum is either its place of incorporation or its principal 
place of business.92 Lower courts might support this broad reading by 
referencing Justice Ginsburg’s characterization of Perkins as the 
“paradigm” case,93 and her reference to only three examples where general 
jurisdiction is appropriately exercised—an individual’s domicile and a 
corporation’s principal place of business or its place of incorporation.94 
Importantly, these divergent interpretations reveal that the “at home” 
language adopted by the Court fails to provide a meaningful framework for 
analyzing cases concerning the application of general personal jurisdiction.  
The Court’s adoption of the “essentially at home” standard does 
nothing to clarify what has up until now been the misapplication of general 
jurisdiction.95 The Court’s failure to provide a theoretical justification for 
general personal jurisdiction leaves the door open to future confusion as to 
the significance and, more importantly, what it means to be “essentially at 
home.” Additionally, the opinion’s lack of a coherent analytical framework 
encourages divergent holdings on cases presenting identical facts. 
Goodyear presented the court with the opportunity to resolve many issues 
that have plagued lower courts in their consideration of general 
                                                                                                                     
 91. Id.  
 92. Hoffheimer, supra note 14, at 585; Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853. 
 93. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54 (stating that the paradigm forum for an individual is that 
individual’s domicile and that for a corporation the paradigm forum would be one where the 
corporation is “fairly regarded as home”). Justice Sandra Day O’Connor referenced Professor 
Brilmayer’s article, which identified the place of incorporation and the principal place of business 
as appropriate forums for the exercise of general jurisdiction. Id. (citing Brilmayer et al., A General 
Look, supra note 11, at 728).   
 94. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54. 
 95  In Florida alone, there are several examples of lower court decisions that have misapplied 
the assertion of general jurisdiction. See Woods v. Nova Companies Belize Ltd, 739 So. 2d 617, 
619 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (applying general jurisdiction over a foreign defendant based on the 
cumulation of the defendant’s contacts in Florida relating to the cause of action); May v. Needham, 
820 So. 2d 430, 431 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (asserting general jurisdiction over a foreign defendant 
based on defendant’s sales to a Florida corporation, travel to Florida, and use of a Florida address); 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Herron, 828 So. 2d 414, 415-16 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding 
general jurisdiction applied to a foreign defendant who was not incorporated in Florida and did not 
have its principal place of business in Florida based on the quantity of sales, advertisements, and 
business directed at Florida.); Northwestern Aircraft Capital v. Stewart, 842 So. 2d 190, 192 (Fla. 
5th DCA 2003) (upholding the lower court’s assertion of general jurisdiction based solely on the 
defendant’s purchases of jets in Florida; transportation of Florida residents into and out of the state; 
and maintenance of its jets within the state). 
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jurisdiction. The broad, ambiguous language of the case will surely present 
more issues in years to come.   
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